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Abstract 
There  is  general  agreement  that  banking 
supervision and resolution have to be organised 
at  the  same  level.  It  is  often  argued,  however, 
that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance 
because it is too politically sensitive. 
This  note  proposes  to  apply  the  principles  of 
subsidiarity  and  re-insurance  to  deposit 
insurance:  Existing  national  deposit  guarantee 
schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much 
as  before  (with  only  minimal  standards  set by 
an EU directive), but they would be required to 
take  out  re-insurance against risks  that  would 
be too large to be covered by them. A European 
Reinsurance  Fund  (EReIF)  would  provide  this 
reinsurance  financed  by  premia  paid  by  the 
national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company 
does  in  the  private  sector.  The  European  Fund 
would pay out only in case of large losses. This 
‘deductible’  would  provide  the  national 
authorities  with  the  proper  incentives,  but  the 
reinsurance  cover  would  stabilize  depositor 
confidence even in the case of large shocks.  
Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible 
also  for  resolution.  Experience  has  shown 
banking  systems  are  more  stable  if  deposit 
insurers are also responsible for resolution. The 
approach proposed here could thus be also used 
to  design  the  ‘Single  Resolution  Mechanism’ 
(SRM) which is being discussed as a complement 
to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). 
It  will  of  course  take  time  to  build  up  the 
funding  for  such  a  reinsurance  fund.  This 
approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy 
problems from the current crisis. 
1.  Introduction and Motivation 
There is currently a discussion about the need for 
a  European-  (or  euro  area-)  wide  deposit 
insurance or guarantee system in the context of 
the plans to create a ‘banking union’ (BU). It is 
widely  agreed  that  a  full  BU  comprises  three 
elements, namely common supervision, common 
funding  for  restructuring  and  common  deposit 
insurance.  Many  academic  observers  (see,  for 
example, the contributions to Beck, 2012) stress 
the need to introduce all three elements together. 
However,  deposit  insurance  has  de  facto  been 
dropped  from  the  official  agenda.1 Some  have 
argued that it is not needed and for others it is 
just politically too contentious (e.g. Pisani Ferry 
and Wolf, 2012).  
The European Commission tabled a proposal for 
a  Directive  on  Deposit  Guarantee  Schemes 
                                                   
1 The  blueprint  of  the  European  Commission  for  a 
‘genuine  EMU’ contains only  a  passing reference  to 
the need for “solid deposit guarantee schemes in all 
Member States”. 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
already  in  2010. 2 However,  the  scope  of  this 
proposed  directive  is  quite  limited  as  it  aims 
only at harmonizing coverage, the arrangements 
for  payout  (e.g.  the  time  limit  for  paying  out 
depositors) and the financing of national DGSs. 
The  Commission  only  proposes  “mutual 
borrowing  between  DGSs,  i.e.  a  borrowing 
facility  in  certain  circumstances”.  Somewhat 
surprisingly,  an  accompanying  Joint  Research 
Centre  report  (JRC,  2011)  on  deposit  insurance 
does not consider the reinsurance model at all. 3 
The case for maintaining deposit insurance at the 
national level is that in theory the national level 
remains  best  qualified  to  evaluate  idiosyncratic 
risks  of  the  banks  under  its  watch.  National 
DGSs  should  also  have  the  right  incentive  to 
monitor individual banks as they would have to 
pay  for  any  losses.  In  reality,  however,  most 
national  DGS  (and  national  supervisors  in 
general)  operate  within  so  many  political 
constraints that they have little influence except 
for very small banks. 
Experience  has  also  confirmed  that  national 
authorities  are  not  well  placed  to  evaluate 
systemic  risk,  i.e.  risks  to  their  entire  banking 
system.  There  are  at  least  two  sources  of  such 
shocks which often threaten the entire national 
banking  system:  i)  local  credit  bubbles  and  ii) 
market  segmentation  and  the  sudden  stops  to 
cross-border funding. 
Local  credit  bubbles.  The  national  real  estate 
bubbles were not recognised as such in Spain or 
Ireland,  although  foreign  observers  and  EU 
institutions  had  repeatedly  warned  about 
unsustainable developments. Moreover, national 
authorities are also not well placed in practice to 
deal  with  banks  that  are  well  connected  at  the 
national  political  level,  either  because  of  size 
(‘national champions’) or because of the nature 
                                                   
2  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ 
guarantee/20100712_proposal_en.pdf 
3  Under  the  heading  “Pan-EU  DGS”,  this  report 
“explored  the  option  to  establish  a  pan-EU  DGS, 
either:  
a.  in  the  form  of  a  single  entity  replacing  the 
existing schemes, or 
b. in the form of a complementary fund to existing 
DGS (‘28th regime’), or 
c.  structured  as a  network  of  schemes  providing 
each  other  with  mutual  assistance  (‘European 
system of DGS’).” 
of  their  business  (banks  financing  local  real 
estate  development).  This  leads  to  inacceptable 
delays in loss recognition and capital-absorbing 
losses, pushing losses first on national taxpayers 
and subsequently on European taxpayers. 
Market segmentation and the sudden stops to cross-
border  funding.  Liquidity  is  a  systemic,  market 
property  and  given  that  the  interbank  bank 
market  is  (or  rather  used  to  be)  cross-border 
within the euro area, this is a source of shocks 
which national authorities are not well placed to 
assess.  
The  experience  with  Spain  has  shown  that  the 
confidence in the national banking system can be 
threatened (or completely lost, as in the case of 
Greece)  when  a  very  large  shock  (whether  to 
liquidity  or  a  local  real  estate  bust)  puts  the 
entire system under such stress that the national 
guarantee system is clearly no longer capable of 
protecting  depositors.  Under  these  conditions, 
the entire economy will be in recession; and the 
sovereign  will  also  come  under  so  much 
pressure  that  it  might  no  longer  constitute  a 
reliable back up – leading to what has variously 
been described as a ‘diabolical’ loop between the 
banks and the sovereign. 
There is thus a need to re-insure national deposit 
insurance  systems  against  large,  systemic 
events.4  
The  need  for  reinsurance  thus  arises  even 
without considering the specific problems posed 
by  large  cross-border  bank  groups.  In  reality, 
most  large  cross-border  banks  operate  via 
subsidiaries. These subsidiaries contribute to the 
DGS  of  their  host  countries  the  same  way  as 
purely  national  banks,  and  the  national  DGS 
would have to pay out should one of these large 
cross-border  banks  fail.  This  provides  some 
automatic burden-sharing.  
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Figure 1. The relative importance of deposits as a function of bank size 
 
Source: CEPS database (see Ayadi et al., 2012). 
However,  the  burden-sharing  is  limited  to  the 
case  of  cross-border  banks  operating  with 
subsidiaries.  Losses  at  large-cross  border 
banking  groups  (mostly  classified  as  SIFIs,  or 
significantly  important  financial  institutions) 
pose other problems, as the distribution of assets 
across  subsidiaries  will  determine  where  the 
losses  arise.  The  experience  with  Fortis  has 
clearly  shown  this  phenomenon.  SIFIs  are 
usually  saved  by  government  intervention 
because  of  the  threat  they  pose  to  systemic 
stability.  Deposit  insurers  are  thus  not  directly 
involved  and  anyway  do  not  constitute  the 
largest creditors because these large institutions 
are  mostly  universal  banks  for  which  deposit-
taking  is  only  one  part  of  the  overall  business 
model  with  customer  deposits  amounting 
usually to much less than one-half of the balance 
sheet.  Figure  1  above  shows  the  share  of 
customer  deposits  by  bank  size  (measured  as 
total  assets)  of  the  about  60+  euro  area  banks 
subjected  to the  EBA stress  test  of  2010,  which 
covered for all the member countries the largest 
banks accounting for at least one-half of assets at 
the national level.5 
                                                   
5 The  2010  stress  test  exercise  was  conducted  on  a 
sample  of  91  European  banks.  In  total,  national 
Existing  mutual  guarantee  schemes  provide 
another rationale for reinsurance. These schemes, 
notably among the German savings banks, exist 
usually  among  groups  of  small  savings 
institutions,  all  of  which  have  a  very  similar 
business model. Groups of banks with a mutual 
guarantee system constitute essentially one large 
bank  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  deposit 
insurance system. There is no reason to dissolve 
systems that have worked well so far. But these 
                                                                                     
supervisory  authorities  from  20  EU  member  states 
participated in the exercise. In each of the 27 member 
states,  the  sample  was  built  by  including  banks,  in 
descending order of size, so as to cover at least 50% of 
the respective national banking sector, as expressed in 
terms of total assets. As the stress test was conducted 
at the highest level of consolidation for the bank in 
question,  the  exercise  also  covers  subsidiaries  and 
branches  of  these  EU  banks  operating  in  other 
member states and in countries outside Europe. As a 
result, for the remaining seven member states where 
more  than  50%  of  the  local  market  was  already 
covered  through  the  subsidiaries  of  EU  banks 
participating  in  the  exercise,  no  further  bank  was 
added to the sample. The 91 banks represent 65% of 
the total assets of the EU banking sector as a whole. 
For  about  10  of  these  banks  no  data  on  customer 
deposits was available.  
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groups clearly are not immune to systemic risk. 
A first reinsurance layer for groups of savings or 
cooperative  banks  which  have  a  mutual 
guarantee  agreement  could  be  provided  at  the 
national  level.  But  this  is  not  sufficient  since 
these  groups  account  for  a  large  share  of 
deposits  in  some  countries  and  could  thus 
overtax  the  loss  absorption  capacity  of  the 
national authorities. 
There has been some debate about the need for a 
European  approach  to  deposit  insurance.  For 
example, Pisani-Ferry & Wolff (2012) argue that 
a common deposit insurance fund is not needed 
at  this  point.  The  reason  given  is  that  deposit 
funds insure against the failure of a single, small 
financial institution, but not against the failure of 
the  euro  area  financial  system.  This  is 
undoubtedly  true.  But  their  argument 
strengthens actually the case made here for the 
need  for  some  back-up  for  national  DGSs  that 
experience  a  shock  that  is  systemic  at  the 
national level, but not at the euro-area level. The 
experience  with  Spain  and  Ireland  has  shown 
that  this  type  of  shock  can  certainly  arise. 
Depositor  confidence  everywhere  should  be 
strengthened  if  it  is  known  that  there  exists  a 
credible  back-up  for  national  deposit  insurance 
funds. 
A single common European (euro area) Deposit 
Insurance  System  managed  by  a  common 
agency,  which  can  also  manage  resolution 
(EDIRA)  as  proposed  by  Gros  &  Schoenmaker 
(2012), would be preferable to take care both of 
large  cross-border  banks  and  systemic  risks 
(which can arise from national banks, sometimes 
even  collections  of  small  banks).  But, 
unfortunately, this seems to be seen as a step too 
far in the present political context, although the 
existing national deposit guarantee systems are 
usually without teeth and without real funding. 
Moreover,  these  national  DGS  are  usually  not 
managed  by  independent  institutions  which 
could  actually  resolve  a  bank  if  needed.  By 
contrast,  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  (FDIC)  in  the  US  is  completely 
unconcerned  by  the  local  political  difficulties 
that might arise when it swoops in and resolves 
an ailing bank over a weekend. During this crisis 
the FDIC has been able to resolve hundreds of 
(admittedly  mostly  small)  banks,  whereas  in 
Europe  very  few  banks  have  been  resolved  or 
allowed  to  fail.  The  FDIC  follows  a  strict 
‘waterfall’ of claims with junior debt first to be 
wiped  out  and  even  senior  bond-holders  often 
suffering large haircuts. The FDIC model would 
thus  be  preferable  for  the  EU  as  well,  but 
unfortunately  it  does  not  seem  to  have  any 
chance of being adopted at present.  
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  one  of  the  key 
arguments for the creation of the FDIC was the 
fact  that  deposit  guarantee  had  been  a 
responsibility of the states. But during the crisis 
of the early 1930s, most of the deposit schemes at 
the state level had become insolvent (Golembe, 
1960)  as  contagion  led  to  a  cascade  of  local 
banking panics which overwhelmed the capacity 
of the local DGSs of the time.6  
One  of  the  key  reasons  why  state  deposit 
insurance  systems  failed  was  the  fact  that  the 
small undiversified banks exposed to local real 
estate bubbles and agricultural difficulties were 
prone  to  systemic  crisis  (Thies  &  Gerlowski, 
1989).  This  problem  remains  even  today.  The 
Spanish and Irish deposit insurance funds would 
be overwhelmed by the multiple failures within 
a  small  undiversified  group  of  banks  resulting 
from a local boom and bust. Federal re-insurance 
would diversify this risk of local shocks. 
The need to provide insurance against systemic 
shocks remains today as important as ever. This 
need motivates the following concrete proposal. 
2.  Basic principles of reinsurance 
A  first  point  is  that  what  is  needed  is 
reinsurance, not a mutual guarantee (as among 
the  Sparkassen  in  Germany).  This  implies  that 
the  reinsurance  scheme  proposed  here  will  not 
put the deposits of savers in virtuous countries 
at risk. 
A  new  institution  –  the  European  Reinsurance 
Fund (EReIF) – would have to be created. This 
institution would collect premia from all national 
DGSs  and  would  pay  out  in  case  losses  at  the 
national level exceed a certain threshold. 
2.1  Compulsory reinsurance with a 
deductible 
The  compulsory  element  is  indispensable. 
Otherwise a serious adverse selection bias would 
                                                   
6 See Aizenman (2012) on the lessons from the US for 
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arise. Differences in risk profiles are no reason to 
allow any national DGS to opt out.  
(National)  Deductible:  As  for  any  insurance, 
there  should  be  a  first  loss  tranche,  or 
deductable, which is borne at the national level. 
This means that the losses that might arise if a 
small  to  medium  sized  bank  fails  somewhere 
these  losses  would  have  to  be  covered  by  the 
national DGS alone. This ‘deductible’ should be 
of such a size that the national DGS could pay 
out  without  endangering  its  own  viability.  It 
should be proportional to the size of the national 
fund accumulated, which in turn should be large 
enough  to  deal  with  the  failure  of  any  single 
domestic bank (but not necessarily the EU-wide 
deposits  of  the  large  cross-border  banking 
groups). The Commission has proposed to set as 
a target for each national DGS a fund equivalent 
to 1.5% of (insured) deposits. The national DGSs 
should  then  dedicate  a  part  of  the  risk  premia 
they  collect  from  their  banks  to  reinsure 
themselves  with  the  EReIF.  As  a  rough  guess 
about  one-third  to  one-half  of  the  premia 
collected  at  the national  level might  be  needed 
for  the  reinsurance  against  systemic  or  large 
national shocks.  
The contract between the EReIF and the national 
DGS  would  thus  specify  that  the  EReIF  would 
pay out if, over a time period to be specified (say 
2-3 years), the total claims on the national DGS 
exceed  (e.g.  two  times)  the  fund  accumulated 
nationally.  Another  way  to  specify  the 
reinsurance event would be to fix the deductible 
(or  national  first  loss  piece)  in  terms  of  a 
percentage of GDP. 
Reinsurance  is  thus  completely  different  from 
lending  among  national  DGSs,  as  proposed  by 
the European Commission. A national DGS will 
need  financial  support  only  if  the  country 
experiences  a  systemic  crisis.  But  these  are 
exactly  the  conditions  under  which  the  other 
DGS systems will not want to lend and it will be 
difficult  to  force  the  stronger  DGSs  to  lend  to 
others  in  crisis.  Moreover,  this  mutual  lending 
will  constitute  a  vehicle  for  contagion,  which 
should be avoided.7 
There  will  be  limits  to  the  amount  the  EReIF 
pays out. The limit is likely to be large enough to 
cover systemic events in small- to medium-sized 
                                                   
7 A 2001 JRC study did not consider the reinsurance 
approach. 
Member States. The empirical literature indicates 
that the average cost of a banking crisis is around 
5% of GDP. Even for a country like Spain, this 
would translate into €50 billion, and should thus 
be  manageable  by  a  fund  of  this  order  of 
magnitude. 
A systemic shock to a large country could not be 
handled  by  the  EReIF  alone.  In  such  a  case, 
recourse to the ESM will be unavoidable because 
any  systemic  crisis  of  a  large  member  country 
will lead to systemic consequences for the entire 
euro area economy. It will then be up to the fiscal 
authorities  represented  in  the  ESM  to  decide 
whether European taxpayers’ money should be 
used to intervene.  
How much protection could be provided by the 
reinsurance  model  proposed  here?  If  one 
assumes that one-half of the premia are needed 
to  cover  against  systematic  risk,  the  protection 
provided by EReIF would be inverse to the size 
of the country. For example, for a small country 
which accounts only for 5% of all deposits, the 
common fund would be 20 times as large as the 
national fund. Even for a country accounting for 
10% of all deposits (e.g. Spain), the EReIF would 
still  be  ten  times  larger  than  the  national  fund 
and thus be much more able to deal with a loss 
that might  be  too  large to  be  dealt  with  at  the 
national level.  
2.2  Premiums and management 
Risk premia should of course reflect differences 
in risk. Systemic events materialise rarely. It will 
thus be very difficult to calculate the appropriate 
premia. There will be long periods during which 
no  systemic  event  occurs,  and  hopefully  many 
countries will never experience a systemic crisis 
in a life time. But one could use the expertise of 
the  large  European  reinsurance  industry  to 
assess the proper premium for this type of rare 
event. A real institution will be needed; a mere 
‘post box’ system without expertise at the centre 
will  not  work  because  it  would  not  be  able  to 
properly assess the risk of the national DGS. It is 
of  course  essential  that  the  institution  that sets 
the  premia  for  the  reinsurance  is  completely 
independent  of  political  influence  in  its  risk 
assessment. This seems to exclude the ESM in its 
present form because its staff has little autonomy 
under a Board that is dominated by the national 
finance ministers whose main mandate is to look 
after the interests of their national taxpayers, and 6 | DANIEL GROS 
 
not the stability of the whole system. One could 
of  course  imagine  that  the  ESM  evolves  into  a 
‘European Monetary Fund’  which  provides  the 
back-up  to  solvent  but  illiquid  sovereigns  and 
banks.  This  would  require  an  experienced 
professional staff with substantial independence. 
This  could  be  built  up,  but  would  take  a  long 
time. 
The  EReIF  would  not  need  to  have  expert 
knowledge  in  bank  management,  but  would 
need  to  look  out  for  systemic,  macroeconomic 
risk.  In  principle,  this  expertise  is  already 
available  in  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board 
(ESRB).  It  would  thus  be  important  to  find  an 
institutional solution under which this expertise 
can  be  used  by  the  EReIF.  For  example,  the 
EReIF  could  be  empowered  to  increase  the 
premia  it  charges  to  the  national  DGSs 
concerned if the national authorities had ignored 
a warning and a recommendation from the ESRB 
to  undertake  certain  actions  to  forestall  a 
potential danger to price stability.8 
The  EReIF  should  also  be  able  to  judge  the 
overall  quality  of  the  national  DGSs,  which 
requires  expertise  in  systems  management, 
rather than analysts of bank balance sheets. The 
EReIF should thus have the right to inspect the 
quality of national supervision and the practice 
of national DGSs, checking for example whether 
premia  are  properly  adjusted  for  risk.  Here  it 
could  benefit  from  the  expertise  of  the 
Directorate General for Competition Policy (DG 
Comp)  of  the  European  Commission.  In  the 
private sector such a supervision of the reinsured 
is  usually  not  feasible.  This  is  why  a 
fundamental  principle  of  private  reinsurance 
contracts  is  “The  Duty  of  Utmost  Good  Faith” 
(Devery and Farrell, 2008)9. Under this principle; 
                                                   
8  A  warning  under  the  excessive  imbalances 
procedure  that  is  managed  by the  Commission  and 
decided by the ECOFIN Council could of course be 
taken as another signal to the EReIF that the DGS of 
the  country  in  question  faces  a  greater  risk  of  a 
systemic event. 
9  “One  of  the  most  fundamental  principles  in 
reinsurance – indeed, what sets the reinsurance field 
apart from most other industries – is the concept of 
utmost  good  faith  (also  known  as  “uberrimae fides”). 
The  duty  originated  in  the  context  of  marine 
insurance  law,  when  underwriters  had  no  practical 
means  of  inspecting  reinsured  ships  or  cargo  in 
distant ports.” 
the EReIF should be present at the table once a 
national DGS is nearing the borderline where a 
pay-out from the EReIF would be triggered. The 
EReIF  would  then  need  to  give  its  consent  to 
measures  that  would  reduce  loss-absorption 
capacity  (e.g.  the  plan  by  Bankia  to  reimburse 
certain instruments that are formally counted as 
tier one capital at one-half the face value). Here 
again,  a  collaboration  with  DG  Comp  would 
make sense.  
2.3  Transition 
A  final  question  is  how  to  deal  with  legacy 
problems  in  some  of  the  banking  systems  that 
are  already  under  stress.  For  countries  like 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the banking 
problems have  already  become systemic. If  the 
national governments temporarily lose access to 
financial  markets  and  are  thus  not  able  to 
provide  immediate  backing  to  their  own  DGS, 
these legacy problems will have to be resolved 
by  recourse  to  lending  from  the  European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Resolution will then 
involve  winding  down  non-viable  bank 
operations  and  recapitalising  viable  bank 
operations  under  the  broad  supervision  of  the 
ECB in the context of the new Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, but the responsibility for the losses 
would  remain  with  the  national  authorities 
under whose watch they arose. 
However,  in  the  meantime,  the  new  system 
could  already  start,  with  the  EReIF  gradually 
building up its capital. The next systemic crisis 
will be somewhere else and some time off. There 
should  thus  be  enough  time  to  build  a  new 
institution  and  accumulate  enough  funding 
before the next systemic crisis hits. 
3.  Conclusions 
National  deposit  insurance  is  not  stable  in  a 
monetary union. With supervision now moving 
towards  the  European  level,  there  is  an urgent 
need  to  reconsider  the  framework  for  deposit 
insurance as well.  
This paper has proposed a two-level framework 
in  which  deposit  insurance  would  remain  a 
national  responsibility,  only  subject  to  some 
minimal  standards  set  by  an  EU  directive,  but 
the national DGSs would be required to take out 
reinsurance  against  systemic  shocks.  The 
responsibility for losses by individual (and non-PRINCIPLES OF A TWO-TIER EUROPEAN DEPOSIT (RE-)INSURANCE SYSTEM | 7 
 
systemic) institutions would thus remain at the 
national level. But the existence of the European 
Reinsurance scheme would stabilise the system 
even  if  a  large,  idiosyncratic  shock  destabilises 
the  local  economy  and  puts  the  national 
guarantee in doubt. 
Reinsurance  does  not  imply  a  full,  across-the-
board  guarantee.  The  fears  that  a  common 
deposit  insurance  scheme  would  lead  to  large 
transfers  across  countries  is  thus  unfounded.  It 
would anyway be introduced gradually to make 
clear that it is not intended as a mechanism to 
distribute,  ex  post,  the  losses  from  the  present 
crisis. 
No  legal  framework  can  fully  forestall  the 
danger  that  a  member  country  under  extreme 
stress decides to leave the euro and reintroduce a 
national  currency.  However,  the  existence  of 
reinsurance for household deposits would make 
it less likely that such extreme stress arises and 
would provide another incentive for any country 
experiencing a large shock to remain within the 
common currency area. 
A  credible  deposit  insurance  has  to  be  paired 
with  tough  supervision  and  the  willingness  to 
intervene  early,  bailing  in  private  investors  as 
much  as  possible.  Experience  has  shown  (Beck 
and  Laeven  (2006))  that  this  is  more  likely  to 
happen if the deposit insurer is also responsible 
for resolution. This is understandable given that 
the deposit insurer has an incentive to avoid a 
bail  out  of  the  creditors  because  that  increases 
the  danger  that  it  will  have  to  use  its  own 
funding  to  guarantee  deposits.  A  system  with 
purely national deposit insurance, but a partially 
common bank resolution framework is likely to 
lead to inefficient solutions. 
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Annex  I.  FDIC:  four  score  years  of 
deposit insurance in the US  
The FDIC was created in the midst of the Great 
Depression  which had  reached  the  worst  point 
when  the  US  banking  system  was  close  to 
collapse  and  after  many  attempts  to  create  a 
federal  deposit  insurance  system  had  failed 
previously. For twenty years (between 1913 and 
1933)  the  US had  a  central  bank  while  deposit 
insurance had remained at the state level. During 
the first years of the Great Depression most state 
deposit insurance schemes failed. 
Since its inception the FDIC has resolved about 
four  thousand  banks,  an  average  of  about  125 
banks closed per year. At the peak of the present 
crisis (2009) the FDIC had to intervene in about 
150  banks.  By  contrast,  in  Europe  less  a  few 
dozen banks were allowed to go under.  
Total  losses  incurred  in  the  about  3  thousand 
bank restructuring operations since 1986 amount 
to  190  billion  USD.  Most  of  this  has  been 
financed by the own income of the FDIC (interest 
on assets, assessment fees etc). 
The  Federal  Government  provided  initial 
funding  for  FDIC  with  roughly  $290  million 
from the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve, 
equivalent to about 5 % of the GDP of 56 billion 
USD 1933. (Similar to the size of the ESM today.) 
Since 1991 the amount of money the FDIC can 
borrow  from  the  Treasury  had  been  capped  at 
$30  billion.  This  amount  appeared  too  small 
relative to the scale of the potential call on the 
FDIC during a major crisis. Since 2009 the FDIC 
is  allowed  to  borrow  as  much  as  $500  billion 
(about 3 % of US GDP) from the Treasury if the 
Treasury,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  White 
House  believe  it  is  warranted.  Otherwise,  the 
agency can borrow up to $100 billion. 
Distribution  of  losses:  experience  has  shown 
most years the FDIC has very little to do, with 
less than a dozen banks requiring intervention. 
However,  during  major  crisis  the  number  of 
banks  failing  spikes  and  the  losses  spike.  The 
1986  Savings  and  loans  crisis  led  to  cumulated 
losses of about 2% of US GDP over about five to 
six years. The 2007-08 crisis cost ‘only’ about 1% 
of US GDP. 
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Annex II. Two-stage deposit insurance: An illustration 
Figure 1. The European Reinsurance Fund in tranquil times 
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Figure 2. The European Reinsurance Fund when losses at national level are small 
 
 
Figure 3. The European Reinsurance Fund when losses at national level are large 
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